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The Role of the Courts in Time of War
William C. Banks
Abstract
The role of the courts in judging the actions of government in
wartime has ranged from extreme deference to careful probing of
alleged government excesses over more than two centuries. The
courts’ record has reflected the nature of the armed conflicts the
United States has engaged in and the legal bases for the actions at
issue. In the aggregate, the courts have served as a necessary
counterweight to government overreaching in times of national
security crisis. It is easy to underestimate the institutional problems
confronting judges who are asked to make momentous decisions in
times of national crisis—difficulties of fact-finding and assessing
the risks of being wrong, among others. Yet no other part of
government is as equipped as the judiciary to anchor the nation to
its core values during a storm.

 Professor William C. Banks is an internationally recognized authority in
national security law, counterterrorism, and constitutional law. Banks has helped
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Mitchel Wallerstein and Renee de Nevers), New Battlefields/Old Laws: Critical
Debates from the Hague Convention to Asymmetric Warfare, “Legal Sanctuaries
and Predator Strikes in the War on Terror,” “Programmatic Surveillance and
FISA – Of Needles in Haystacks,” and “Providing ‘Supplemental Security’ – The
Insurrection Act and the Military Role in Responding to Domestic Crises.” Since
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I. Introduction
If there was a “war on the rule of law”1 after 9/11, it was waged
primarily by the Executive Branch, not the courts. To be sure, the
courts often deferred to Executive Branch decisions during the
unhelpfully labeled “war on terror.” Deference is generally
appropriate when courts review actions of the elected branches. At
other times, however, the courts overturned or limited Bush
Administration national security decisions. The mixed judicial
record continues during the Obama Administration and the
ongoing armed conflict against al Qaeda and its affiliates.2
To the extent that a pattern of judicial deference may be traced
through the war on terror disputes, the Bush-era decisions reflect
tendencies that began with Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s,
when the courts began to employ a special deference to actions
taken by the military, ordered by a civilian commander in chief.
Yet a series of war on terror-era Supreme Court decisions on
military detention practices between 2004 and 2008 repudiated, or
at least limited, the worst excesses of Executive unilateralism
during the Bush presidency. It is too soon to tell whether those

1. Wayne McCormack, U.S. Judicial Independence: Victim in the “War on
Terror”, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 305 (2014) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). This Article is written as an invited response to Professor
McCormack’s article.
2. See McCormack, supra note 1, at 312, 344–46 (describing the mixed set
of decisions that courts have issued under the Obama administration).
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decisions also signaled a renewed commitment for the courts to
review carefully the merits of decisions involving the military.
There are at least two other dimensions to the story of the
judicial role in wartime. Sometimes federal courts have been
anything but deferent. First, judges may become activist
lawmakers, providing remedies to victims of unlawful government
conduct in countering terrorism, for example, or making new law
in ruling for government contractors to immunize them from
plaintiffs’ claims.3
Second, federal judges also preside over criminal prosecutions
of alleged terrorists. Even while the Bush Administration was
unilaterally shaping the contours of its war on terror, the White
House, Justice Department, and federal courts were implementing
an important policy to use intelligence and law enforcement tools
as part of a multi-faceted set of approaches to countering
terrorism. Nearly 500 criminal prosecutions involving
international terrorism have been concluded since 9/11,4 and
Supermax federal prisons house more than 350 convicted
international terrorists.5 The judges made evidentiary and other
rulings in these cases, but juries decided guilt or innocence. The
deference label simply does not fit the criminal cases.
Meanwhile, Congress has forbidden the closure of the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility and prohibited the Obama
Administration from bringing Gitmo detainees to stand trial in the
United States.6 Yet the Administration has successfully
3. See, e.g., Al-Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Va.
2013), vacated and remanded sub nom. Al-Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc.,
758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014); Benjamin Wittes et. al, The Emerging Law of
Detention 2.0: The Guantanamo Habeas Cases as Lawmaking, Brookings (May
12,
2011),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2011/05/guantanamowittes (last updated Mar. 29, 2013) (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILLUSION OF JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
IN US TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 2 (2014) (“Since the September 11 attacks, more
than 500 individuals have been prosecuted in US federal courts for terrorism or
related offenses—40 cases per year on average.”).
5. Fred Kaplan, There Are Already 355 Terrorists in American Prisons,
SLATE
(MAY
29
2009,
5:33
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2009/05/there_are_
already_355_terrorists_in_american_prisons.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. See Ken Gude, What Has to Happen to Close Guantanamo Bay This Year,
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transferred alleged terrorists apprehended overseas to civilian
detention facilities in the United States and has prosecuted them
in the federal courts,7 over the loud and vitriolic complaints by
critics in Congress and elsewhere that these suspects belong at
Gitmo and should be tried by military commission.8 In these
instances the Administration relies on the federal courts as part of
a whole-of-government effort to counter terrorism.
Throughout our history, the courts have been central
participants in shaping the limits of governmental authority and
the resultant scope of civil liberties during wartime. The war on
terror—more accurately described as a war against al Qaeda, its
affiliates, and the Taliban—was not our gravest crisis. Our nation
was born through violent revolution, and the Civil War was the
contemporary equivalent of an all-out nuclear attack on the nation.
In their time, the two World Wars were potentially more
calamitous than the 9/11 era. In each of these wars, the Judicial
Branch was an active participant, sometimes generously deferent
to the government’s expansive interpretation of its wartime
constitutional prerogatives, other times especially attentive to
what have been viewed as unchanging constitutional values.
The war on terror likewise required judges to make critical
judgments about the Constitution and other laws, and about the
institutional role of the judiciary in a time of war. The record of the

CTR.
FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
(Jan.
31,
2014),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2014/01/31/83328/whathas-to-happen-to-close-guantanamo-bay-this-year/
(arguing
the
Obama
Administration should push Congress to lift the transfer ban on Gitmo detainees)
(last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
7. E.g., Richard A. Serrano, Detainee in Afghanistan to Face Charges in
U.S. Court, Officials Say, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014, 6:17 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/world/afghanistan-pakistan/la-fg-afghanistan-detaineeus-court-20141023-story.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. See Danny Gonzalez, Terrorists Shouldn’t Be Tried in the Same Courts
as
U.S.
Citizens,
U.S.
NEWS
(Mar.
12,
2013,
1:59
PM),
http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-al-qaeda-spokesperson-sulaimanabu-ghaith-be-prosecuted-in-federal-court/terrorists-shouldnt-be-tried-in-thesame-courts-as-us-citizens (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) (asserting that “[t]he
process of military tribunals currently in place at Guantanamo Bay is perfectly
legal and satisfies the right of due process for terrorist suspects”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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courts has been mixed, but not dramatically different from other
periods of armed conflict.
II. The Case Against the Bush Administration
The Bush Administration claimed a practically limitless
constitutional authority to act unilaterally during a war that
lasted longer than World War II. As viewed by the Administration,
terrorism and associated threats in the post-Cold War world
simply outstripped past security threats against the United States.
Their thinking was that these changed circumstances required a
more flexible kind of executive power, one that cannot be readily
accommodated with multi-branch deliberation.9 In the face of these
threats, the qualities that Alexander Hamilton identified as
characteristic of the Executive alone—the capacity to act with
“decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch”10—are overwhelming and
essential advantages. When the nature of warfare against these
unconventional enemies relies less on set-piece battles between
nation-states and more on tools like intelligence gathering and
covert action and quick strikes against terrorists in sanctuaries
across sovereign boundaries from traditional battlefields, waiting
for deliberation or even review or ratification by Congress or the
courts would compromise America’s ability to defend itself. As a
result, the institutional roles and individual rights that those
traditional constitutional structures are designed to protect may
be shortchanged along the way.
In the first few years after 9/11, the argument was used to
justify unprecedented executive unilateralism in high profile
disputes that found their way to our courts. The national security
trump card allegedly overcame laws barring torture and cruel or
degrading treatment;11 supported the “outsourcing” of torture to
9. See Jennifer Daskal & Stephen I. Vladeck, After the AUMF, 5 HARV.
NAT’L SEC. J. 116, 122–23 (2014) (comparing the coordinated, multi-branch action
against co-belligerents during World War II with the Bush Administration’s
unilateral practices under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(AUMF)).
10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
11. See Ray Sanchez, Obama: U.S. ‘Crossed a Line’ and Tortured After 9/11
Attacks,
CNN
(last
updated
Aug.
3,
2014,
3:14
PM)
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/01/politics/obama-torture-comments/ (last visited
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other countries, such as Syria and Egypt;12 permitted detaining
individuals, including Americans, indefinitely without any due
process;13 and allowed spying on Americans’ phone calls and
e-mails in violation of federal statutes and the Fourth
Amendment.14 The federal courts were complicit in some, though
hardly all, of these excesses, but the driving force was the
Executive.
III. Historic Highlights
When Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United States in the
mid-nineteenth century, he was struck by the central role that the
courts play in our system of government: “Scarcely any political
question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or
later, into a judicial question.”15 It is true that our federal courts
have sometimes turned Tocqueville’s observation on its head by
refusing to decide legal questions on various grounds. Nonetheless,
the federal judiciary and its record over more than two centuries
are celebrated worldwide for making principled decisions based on
the rule of law and for the judges’ independence from the elected
branches of our government.
Early in our nation’s history, the role of the federal courts in
the constitutional framework for national security operated more
or less as the Framers envisioned. In a trilogy of decisions
Nov. 26, 2014) (noting that certain “enhanced interrogation techniques” likely
constituted torture) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s
“Extraordinary Rendition” Program, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106.
13. See Erik Kain, President Obama Signed the National Defense
Authorization Act—Now What?, FORBES (Jan. 2, 2012, 11:56 AM)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2012/01/02/president-obama-signed-thenational-defense-authorization-act-now-what/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2014)
(suggesting the National Defense Authorization Act may allow indefinite
detention and claiming the federal government has been “overreacting” in
response to terrorism after 9/11, “allow[ing] our fear to undermine our freedom
we concede to the very terrorists we hope to defeat”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
14. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 746–53
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that the plaintiffs did not succeed on their statutory or
Fourth Amendment claims regarding the Government’s bulk telephony metadata
program).
15. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (1945).
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upholding the legality of the undeclared war with France, the
Supreme Court actively participated in affirming the principle that
the executive discretion to conduct an undeclared or limited war
was prescribed by those actions authorized by Congress.16 In one
of the cases, Little v. Barreme,17 the Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Marshall, held that a Navy officer who had executed a
presidential order during the war with France was liable to the
owners of the vessel he had seized leaving from a French port. 18
One of the statutes enacted to authorize the war permitted the
seizure of ships “bound or sailing to” any French port, while the
President’s order said “to or from.”19 Because “the legislature
seem[s] to have prescribed . . . the manner in which this law shall
be carried into execution,”20 what might otherwise have been a
reasonable order by the Commander in Chief could not make
lawful the officer’s act. The Court did not abstain, nor did it defer
to the presidential order.21
Similarly, in United States v. Smith,22 Supreme Court Justice
William Patterson (a Framer of the Constitution from New Jersey),
sitting on circuit, upheld prosecution of Smith and others under
the Neutrality Act,23 a 1794 statute that makes criminal the
mounting of any military operation against a nation with which
16. See Little v. Bareme, 6 U.S. 170, 177 (1804) (upholding the legality of
statutes of the United States prohibiting intercourse with France and its
dependencies); Talbot v. Seaman, 5 U.S. 1, 29 (1801) (examining legislation of
Congress, such as “An Act More Effectually to Protect the Commerce and Coasts
of the United States,” in order to determine the “real situation of America in
regard to France”); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 43 (1800) (“The United States and the
French republic are in a qualified state of hostility. An imperfect war, or a war,
as to certain objects, and to a certain extent, exists between the two nations; and
this modified warfare is authori[z]ed by the constitutional authority of our
country.”).
17. 6 U.S. 170 (1804).
18. See id. at 179 (declaring that instructions from the Executive “cannot
change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which without those
instructions would have been a plain trespass”).
19. An Act Further to Suspend the Commercial Intercourse Between the
United States and France, ch. 10, § 8, 2 Stat. 7 (1800); Little, 6 U.S. at 178.
20. Little, 6 U.S. at 177–78.
21. Id. at 178–79.
22. 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806).
23. An Act in Addition to the Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes
Against the United States, ch. 50, § 5, 1 Stat. 381 (1794).
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the United States is at peace.24 Smith sought immunity from
prosecution on the grounds that the President had authorized his
military plan against Spanish rulers in what is now Venezuela.25
Justice Patterson ruled that “the president . . . cannot control the
statute, nor dispense with its execution, and still less can he
authorize a person to do what the law forbids.”26
The judicial branch also played a central role in some of the
most important actions of the government during the Civil War.
President Lincoln first responded to the attack on Fort Sumter by
blockading the southern ports without going to Congress for a
declaration of war. In The Prize Cases,27 the Supreme Court
sustained the President’s actions, by a 5-4 margin, and held that
the Commander in Chief had a constitutional duty to repel the
attack on the United States without awaiting special legislative
authority, and that Congress’s ratification of the President’s
blockade after the fact compensated for the lack of prior
authorization.28 Note that the Court did not decline to decide the
case because of the political question doctrine or the immunity of
executive officials for their official actions.
When early in the war President Lincoln unilaterally
suspended the writ of habeas corpus and imposed military rule in
Maryland, Chief Justice Taney ruled that the President lacked
unilateral authority to suspend the writ.29 Although Lincoln
ignored Taney’s decision, at the end of the war the full Supreme
Court ruled against the President’s effort to try civilian southern
sympathizer Lambdin Milligan before a military commission in
Indiana, at least in part because the civil courts were open and
operating.30

24. See Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1230 (affirming that the power to make war is
“exclusively vested in [C]ongress”).
25. Id. at 1228–30.
26. Id. at 1230–31.
27. 67 U.S. 635 (1862).
28. See id. at 668 (differentiating between the initiation of a war, for which
the Executive cannot call, and situations in which “war be made by invasion of a
foreign nation,” when “the President is not only authorized but bound to resist
force by force”).
29. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (1861).
30. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 121 (1866).
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Fast forward to World War II. A few weeks after the attack on
Pearl Harbor, in February 1942, President Roosevelt promulgated
an executive order authorizing military commanders to prescribe
“military areas” from which persons might be excluded.31 Several
such areas were created near the West Coast in the coming weeks,
and Congress then made it a crime to remain in any military area
contrary to applicable regulations. The military commander for the
area then issued orders excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry
from these areas. Fred Korematsu, an American citizen of
Japanese ancestry, was convicted for remaining in one of the
forbidden areas. His appeal, like that of Gordon Hirabayashi, who
was convicted for violating a related curfew order, was
representative of the 120,000 Japanese Americans who had been
taken from their homes and placed in internment camps for the
duration of the war. Although the Supreme Court exclaimed that
the racial classification at issue in these appeals required “the
most rigid” scrutiny, the Court accepted uncritically the judgment
of the military authorities and of Congress that persons of
Japanese ancestry presented a security risk to the United States.32
The Court thus endorsed the government’s wholesale
condemnation of the Japanese-American population without any
record evidence of even a single instance of Japanese-American
disloyalty. Careful scrutiny in theory was abdication of the Court’s
role in fact.
World War II also provided a test of the open court rule
adopted by the Supreme Court in Milligan33 during the Civil War.
In 1942, two German submarines landed eight saboteurs on
beaches in New York and Florida. Before they could act, one of
them quickly gave up the group to the FBI. President Roosevelt
ordered that they be tried by military commission, which
sentenced them to death. When the Supreme Court took up the
legality of the military commission this time, in Ex parte Quirin,34

31. Exec. Order No. 9,066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1,407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
32. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 223–24 (1944);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943). But see Ex parte Endo, 323
U.S. 283 (1944) (directing the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to an admittedly
loyal Japanese-American).
33. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
34. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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Milligan was distinguished.35 Although one of the Germans was a
dual citizen, all eight were part of the armed forces of a state on
which we had declared war. The Quirin Court thus created a
declared enemy exception to the open court rule.36 On the one
hand, it was extraordinary for the Supreme Court to entertain on
its merits a high stakes challenge to the President’s military
commission when the outcome of World War II remained very
much in doubt. On the other hand, the Court heard and decided
the fate of the saboteurs hurriedly, without adequate preparation,
and the Justices accepted uncritically dubious justifications for
truncated trial procedures in the military commission.
The preeminent judicial decision in U.S. national security law
was rendered during the Korean War. In Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer,37 the Supreme Court rejected President
Truman’s attempt to seize the nation’s steel mills to avert what he
feared would be a strike that would compromise the war effort. 38
Congress had considered but decided against expressly granting
the President the seizure authority in the Taft-Hartley legislation,
and the President’s actions effectively nationalized a private
industry thousands of miles from the theater of war.39 Again, the
Court did not decline to decide the merits of the case, and a
majority agreed that important separation-of-powers principles
protective of Congress’s role in national security were at risk if the
President’s seizure was sustained.40
In more recent times, the courts began to exhibit a unique
deference to the President’s national security decisions involving
the military.41 For reasons that were never fully articulated, in the
1970s the Supreme Court characterized the military as “a society
apart from civilian society,” superior and more or less exempt from
35. Id. at 19–20.
36. Id. at 29 (noting that “petitioners were charged with an offense against
the law of war which the Constitution does not require to be tried by jury”).
37. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
38. Id. at 588–89.
39. See id. at 586 (“When the Taft-Hartley Act was under consideration in
1947, Congress rejected an amendment which would have authorized such
governmental seizures in cases of emergency.”).
40. Id. at 588–89.
41. DIANE H. MAZUR, A MORE PERFECT MILITARY: HOW THE CONSTITUTION
CAN MAKE OUR MILITARY STRONGER 1–15, 153 (2010).
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civilian judicial oversight.42 In a series of decisions, the Court did
not ask the government to justify or even explain why an alleged
military necessity justifies an intrusion on constitutional rights or
the separation of powers.43 The bare assertion sufficed. One effect
of judicial deference to military decisions, of course, is to send a
message that the military does not have the same legal obligations
as other actors in our government. The other message is that the
civilian commanders in chief may use the military to overcome
legal limits on their actions.
IV. The Federal Courts after 9/11
A. Detention and Rendition
Within weeks of beginning ground combat in Afghanistan in
late 2001, the Bush Administration had to decide where and how
to detain and adjudicate the fate of persons captured on the
battlefields. Bush Administration officials determined that
Guantanamo offered security as well as a location that was on
Cuban soil and leased to the U.S., providing cover, they assumed,
from habeas corpus petitions. The goal was to have the “legal
equivalent of outer space.”44
President Bush relied on his commander-in-chief power and
used the military to implement a program to apprehend and detain
suspected terrorists without charge, without access to counsel or
other due process protections, and without the prospect of release
until the end of the war. The President’s Military Order formalized
a detention system and a plan for eventual military commission
trials that effectively made the executive the maker, enforcer, and
adjudicator of law applied to the detainees, including American
42. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974); see also Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (describing judicial review of the military);
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) (discussing judicial deference for the
military generally).
43. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 353–61 (1980) (justifying
regulations intruding upon the free speech rights of members of the Air Force by
asserting that such regulations were necessary to maintain the integrity of the
military command structure).
44. HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH’S LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR
182 (2009).
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citizens.45 Indeed, the Marine Corps base at Guantanamo Bay was
selected for the military detention and trials because it was
believed to be beyond the reach of our civilian courts.46
Detainees soon began filing habeas corpus petitions in the
federal courts challenging the lawfulness of their detention and
arguing that due process required hearings to permit them to
contest their combatant status. Over a period of more than four
years, the lower courts and then the Supreme Court decided a
series of such challenges on the merits. In doing so, the courts
curtailed to some degree the discretion of the Bush Administration
to run the Guantanamo facility as a sort of law-free zone.
Admittedly, the decisions in Rasul v. Bush,47 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,48
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,49 and Boumediene v. Bush,50 were not
unequivocal victories for the detainees, nor were the decisions
models for clear and consistent doctrinal decision making by the
judiciary. But the courts ruled that habeas corpus jurisdiction was
available to the Guantanamo detainees, due process required some
kind of process for the detainees, military commission trials had to
comply with statutory and law of war requirements for fair
procedure, and habeas corpus could be granted to the detainees by
the federal courts.51
Congress first enacted the Military Commission Act52 in 2006
and effectively gave President Bush the discretion to have military
trials similar to those he had authorized on his own authority.53
45. See Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).

46. Cf. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (finding that federal
courts may have jurisdiction over Guantanamo alien petitioners’ habeas
corpus claims).

47. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
48. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
49. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
50. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
51. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 794–98; Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 632–35; Hamdi,
542 U.S. at 533–39; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 481–85.
52. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-336, 120 Stat. 2600
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, and 42 U.S.C.).
53. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 948d (2012) (granting the Executive Branch the
power to determine whether a detainee is an enemy combatant and vesting
exclusive jurisdiction over enemy combatants in Executive-appointed military
tribunals).
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Since 2008, the federal courts in the D.C. Circuit have struggled to
develop standards to review continuing detentions.54 They are
deciding cases, developing criteria for deciding who may be subject
to continuing detention, and applying similar criteria to challenges
arising from Afghanistan.55 The courts have performed their role
reasonably well under the circumstances, neither deferring
entirely to the government nor imposing trial-type procedures for
detainees.
The courts’ performance was also mixed in responding to the
military detention of U.S. citizens—Hamdi and Jose Padilla—and
resident alien student Ali al-Marri. Hamdi and Padilla each spent
years in military detention in South Carolina, without counsel or
any procedures to determine the lawfulness of detention. Hamdi
was eventually deported after the Supreme Court upheld his
detention but ordered that the government provide him due
process.56 Padilla and then al-Marri were each eventually
transferred from military to civilian custody where they were tried
and convicted (Padilla) or plead guilty (al-Marri) to providing
material support to terrorism.57 The courts acquiesced in executive
branch shenanigans in shuffling them between military and
civilian systems. Al-Marri received some credit at sentencing
based on the harsh conditions of his military confinement, while
Padilla and his mother brought civil lawsuits for wrongful
54. See, e.g., Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1030, 1038 (D.C.Cir.2014)
(concluding that Military Commissions Act did not preclude review of detention
conditions at Guantanamo, even if it precluded review of “other actions” by
detainees); Wazir v. Gates, 629 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that the
powers granted to the executive in 10 U.S.C. § 948d were constitutional).
55. See, e.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 88–99 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(assessing a habeas petition by Afghani detainees using the rubric developed in
Boumedine and Rasul, filtered through a series of interpretive decisions about
Guantanamo detainees made by the D.C. Circuit).
56. Joel Brinkley & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Releases Saudi-American It Had
Captured
in
Afghanistan,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
12,
2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/12/international/middleeast/12hamdi.html
(last visited Oct. 12, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
57. Abby Goodnough, Jose Padilla Convicted on All Counts in Terror Trial,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/16/us/16cndpadilla.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); John Schwartz, Plea Deal Reached With Agent for Al Qaeda, N.Y.
TIMES (May 1, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/us/01marri.html (last
visited Oct. 12, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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confinement and mistreatment while in custody.58 The lawsuits for
damages were dismissed based on the immunities of the federal
defendants for alleged misconduct within the scope of their official
responsibilities.59
More extreme judicial deference to executive abuses was
shown in the extraordinary rendition cases. In El-Masri v. United
States,60 federal courts ruled that the state secrets doctrine made
it impossible for El-Masri to prove his case against the CIA.61 In
Arar v. Ashcroft,62 Canadian citizen Maher Arar unsuccessfully
brought suit in federal court following his detention for twelve days
at Kennedy Airport and eventual rendition to Syria and torture
over ten months in a Syrian prison.63 Although the original
detention by U.S. officials was based on intelligence provided by
Canada, Arar later received a cash settlement from his home
government.64 Holding that Arar could not state a claim under an
available federal statute nor a Bivens claim based on the
Constitution, the Second Circuit dismissed his action.65
B. Surveillance
Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush secretly ordered
the National Security Agency (NSA) to intercept international
telephone and email traffic without obtaining judicial warrants.66
58. Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787 (D.S.C. 2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d
540 (4th Cir. 2012); Schwartz, supra note 57.
59. Lebron, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 805–07.
60. 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
61. Id. at 313.
62. 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
63. Id. at 580–82.
64. See Ottawa Apologizes and Compensates Arar for his Year in Hell,
National Post, http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=dcee6556-58fb43b5-9d34-e4dc04cebbef&p=1 (last visited Dec. 1, 2014) (noting that Arar
received a formal apology and approximately $10.5 million in compensation from
the Canadian government) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
65. Arar, 585 F.3d at 580–82.
66. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without
Courts,
N.Y.
Times
(Dec.
16,
2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0 (last visited Dec. 1, 2005) (noting that President Bush signed an executive
order approving the spying program within months of the September 11th
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What became known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP)
was flatly inconsistent with Congress’s regulation of foreign
intelligence surveillance in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA).67 When the program came to light, the President
defended it in large part on the basis of his commander-in-chief
powers and argued that the program had “helped detect and
prevent possible terrorist attacks on the United States and
abroad.”68 The full scope of the NSA programs remained hidden
until the Edward Snowden disclosures in 2013 led to a raft of
declassifications and statements from Administration officials.
Beyond the FISA violations, the NSA program may have violated
Fourth Amendment privacy and First Amendment free expression
rights of innocent Americans who were subjected to surveillance
without suspicion of wrongdoing or judicial process. The TSP also
threatened the separation of powers by simply ignoring the express
limits of FISA.
Once the TSP was exposed by the New York Times in
December 2005, lawsuits were filed challenging the lawfulness of
surveillance. The public interest plaintiffs ultimately failed to
persuade a court to hear the merits of their FISA and Fourth
Amendment claims due to a lack of standing—they could not show
that any particular conversation had been intercepted.69 After
Congress authorized sweeping programmatic
electronic
surveillance in the 2008 FISA Amendments Act,70 and the
Snowden documents showed the wholesale NSA collection of
metadata of Americans under the authority of a USA PATRIOT
Act71 amendment to FISA, lawsuits were filed challenging the bulk
collection. To date, district courts have reached the merits and split

attacks) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
67. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92
Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885(c) (2012)).
68. President George W. Bush, Radio Address to the American People, Dec.
17, 2005, 2005 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Doc. 1880.
69. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1154–55 (2013).
70. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885(c) (2012)).
71. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 12, 15, 18, 20, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
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on whether the metadata collection violates FISA and the Fourth
Amendment.72 Appeals are pending.73
C. Targeting
When the media reported rumors that American-citizenturned-al Qaeda-operative Anwar al-Aulaqi may be on a target list
for U.S. drone strikes in the campaign against al Qaeda in Yemen,
al-Aulaqi’s father filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin any lethal action
against his son. Applying traditional standing doctrine, his lawsuit
was dismissed, unsurprisingly.74 A father lacks standing to sue on
behalf of his son. After al-Aulaqi’s death in a drone strike in 2011,
a second lawsuit brought by his parents seeking damages for a
constitutional tort was dismissed because of “special factors”
counseling hesitation by the courts under the Bivens doctrine.75
The Bivens doctrine and its application to constitutional torts in
national security settings have never been clear or adequately
illuminated by the courts. More recently, however, FOIA litigation
produced more transparency in the targeting debate, when a
federal court ordered the release of an Office of Legal Counsel
memorandum written in 2010 that concluded that targeting alAulaqi would be lawful.76

72. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 746–53
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (concluding that FISA authorized substantially all metadata
collection and that the collection did not violate the Fourth Amendment);
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2013) (concluding that the court
lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ FISA claims but that the plaintiffs
demonstrated a “substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their Fourth
Amendment claim”).
73. Notice of Appeal, Klayman v. Obama, No. 14-5209 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 28,
2014); Notice of Civil Appeal, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, No. 14-42 (2d
Cir. Jan. 6, 2014). The Clapper appeal was argued on September 2nd.
74. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 54 (D.D.C. 2010).
75. Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 12-1192, 2014 WL 1352452, at *6, *19 (D.D.C.
Apr. 4, 2014).
76. N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 756 F.3d 100, 124 & app. A (2d
Cir. 2014).
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V. Conclusion
Over time and with varying degrees of conviction, the courts
have served as a necessary counterweight to government
overreaching in times of national security crisis, when passions
and momentary impulses are most likely to affect policy. On the
one hand, it is easy to underestimate the institutional problems
confronting judges who are asked to make momentous decisions in
times of national crisis—difficulties of fact-finding and assessing
the risks of being wrong, among others. On the other hand, no
other part of government is as equipped as the judiciary to anchor
the nation to its core values during a storm. The risks of judicial
tolerance or abstinence are simply too great now, as they have been
in other times of war.

